Validating the raster risk assessment method in practice by Vriezekolk, Eelco et al.
 Vriezekolk et al. Validating the Raster Risk Assessment Method in Practice 
 
Short Paper – Planning, Foresight and Risk Analysis 
Proceedings of the ISCRAM 2015 Conference - Kristiansand, May 24-27 
Palen, Büscher, Comes & Hughes, eds. 
 
  
Validating the Raster Risk Assessment Method in Practice 
  
Eelco Vriezekolk 
Radiocommunications Agency 
Netherlands & University of Twente 
e.vriezekolk@utwente.nl 
Sandro Etalle 
Eindhoven University of 
Technology 
s.etalle@tue.nl 
  
Roel Wieringa 
University of Twente  
r.j.wieringa@utwente.nl 
ABSTRACT 
Telecommunication services are essential to modern information systems, 
especially so for crisis management. Telecoms systems are complex and difficult 
to analyse. Current risk assessment methods are either not used because of their 
complexity, or lack rigorous argumentation to justify their results because they are 
oversimplified. Our challenge has been to develop a risk assessment method that 
is both usable in practice and delivers understandable arguments to explain and 
justify its risk evaluations. After experiments to validate the method in laboratory 
environments, we now present the first results from successful application with 
practitioners in a regional crisis organization that provides evidence about the 
practical usability of the method. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information systems are nowadays inseparable from telecommunication. This is 
especially true for information systems for crisis management, where there is a 
trend towards more, and more connected systems, information sharing, and online 
interaction. Unavailability of telecom services therefore poses a large risk to 
effective crisis management. 
Analysis of availability risks for telecom services is difficult. These systems are 
highly complex, information on infrastructures and their vulnerabilities is 
incomplete, and uncertainties are high. Risk assessments therefore rely heavily on 
expert judgments and may lack objectivity. 
To overcome these difficulties we have been developing a risk assessment method 
called Raster (“Risk Assessment by Stepwise Refinement”). We have conducted 
several lab experiments, which showed that the method produces correct results in 
a reliable way when used in controlled circumstances (Vriezekolk, Etalle, 
Wieringa, 2012, 2015). We have not yet validated the method in practice, under 
uncontrolled circumstances. The remaining validation step is to show that, in the 
field, Raster yields correct results against an acceptable cost, and that experts 
perceive the method as usable and useful. In this paper we describe a field test to 
that purpose, performed with a regional crisis organization in the Netherlands. 
A practical validation is essential before we can conclude that Raster offers 
definite advantages over existing risk analysis methods in this domain. Our field 
test provides evidence about the practical usability and usefulness of Raster. 
We first describe the Raster method, past validation in lab settings, and one 
particular traditional risk analysis method for comparison. We then describe our 
field test that is to answer practical questions on the reliability of telecom services 
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while at the same time collecting information to validate our method. We present 
and discuss our results, and conclude with an outlook and invitation for further 
research. 
BACKGROUND 
Previous Research  
Raster is a risk assessment method for availability risks to telecommunication 
services used by crisis organizations (Raster, 2015). Its target users are telecom 
experts together with domain experts from crisis organizations.  
Development of a new risk assessment method requires a number of steps, from 
initial design through validation to implementation (that is, transfer to practice). 
Validation requires a demonstration that the method can be performed and yields 
results that are reliable and correct. Implementation requires at minimum that 
prospective users perceive the method to be useful and easy to use. 
Raster uses diagrams to model telecom services (Vriezekolk et al., 2011). Missing 
knowledge about the technical infrastructure is represented in diagrams by cloud-
shaped subsystems, so that in all cases an end-to-end model can be created. The 
model is refined iteratively, driven by the outcome of prior risk assessment steps. 
Availability risks are estimated qualitatively for each diagram component, in a 
group and consensus based process. A special feature of Raster is the analysis of 
common cause failures (CCFs). A CCF occurs when multiple components fail 
because of a single incident, such as power failure affecting several components, 
or a flawed software update to multiple routers. CCFs are analysed by clustering 
components based on shared properties. For example, for power failures 
components are clustered based on geographical proximity; two components 
cannot be affected by the same power failure if they are sufficiently distant. Raster 
also includes in its risk evaluation potential public sentiments to incidents and risk 
reduction measures, as these sentiments are relevant to decision makers acting in 
the public domain. 
Based on these ideas we continued the development of the method. The first 
validation showed that the method is executable, and produces meaningful results 
in a lab setting (Vriezekolk et al., 2012). One observation was that tool support is 
essential in doing iterative risk assessment on networks of components. Our next 
step in validation was to show that Raster is reliable. By reliable we mean that the 
method can be repeated with the same results. Other terms for this concept are 
repeatability, stability, consistency, and reproducibility. Our second validation 
showed that Raster has a relatively low reliability, but that this is to be expected of 
any method that depends on expert judgment with scarce data (Vriezekolk et al., 
2015). In our view, experts retain a large responsibility for their results. To make 
this explicit, a Raster assessment not only yields risk evaluations, but also the 
justification for these evaluations. There justifications make clear to the decision 
makers what the limitations of the evaluations are. 
Both previous validation experiments took place in a lab setting. Based on their 
outcomes we improved the method and its documentation, and the Raster tool. 
Current Risk Assessment in Safety Regions 
We conducted our field test in a Safety Region. A Safety Region in the Dutch 
system of crisis management is an organization responsible for fire services, 
emergency medical care and crisis management and response. Safety Regions 
serve areas with an average population of 650 thousand; there are 25 Safety 
Regions in the Netherlands. Information and communication technology are 
essential in all activities of a Safety Region (Boersma, Wolbers and Wagenaar, 
2010). 
Safety Regions have a legal obligation to plan for unavailability of electrical 
power, information systems and telecommunications. A study commissioned by 
the Ministry of Safety and Justice revealed that in 2012 most Safety Regions did 
not have such a plan (Dorssen, Holzmann, Franx and Rens, 2012). The ministry 
organized drafting sessions, based on a model crisis plan to stimulate compliance 
and improve the quality of plans. 
The model plan for the Safety Regions starts with an inventory of critical 
processes that must at all times be continued. Then, supporting applications 
(defined as information systems and networks) are identified, and their use in 
critical processes is recorded. Applications are then specified in more detail, on 
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the level of major hardware components. Each component receives a three-level 
score to indicate its overall reliability. For example, the middle level is defined as 
“Somewhat resistant to failure of parts. Redundant parts and supply lines. Not 
always resistant to maintenance (probably available during power failures, not 
during maintenance)”. The reliability of an application is the lowest reliability 
figure of any of its hardware components. The reliability of a process is the lowest 
of that of its supporting applications. The plan then continues with a description of 
existing countermeasures, and concludes with a recommendation for further 
improvement and risk mitigation measures. 
The model crisis plan is useful, as it makes clear which applications and hardware 
components are important, based on a pre-existing list of critical processes. The 
plan is therefore closely tied to organizational priorities. However, we believe that 
the analysis part of the model is weak. Analysts do not justify their selection of 
applications or hardware components. If crucial hardware components are 
overlooked, this will have a significant effect on the overall risk evaluation. Recall 
that reliability of an application is defined as the minimum reliability of its 
hardware components. Omission of even a single low-reliability hardware 
component will inflate the reliability of the application. 
METHOD 
Our object of study is the Safety Region Groningen (SRG). SRG serves a 
relatively sparsely populated province of about 2,300 km
2
 and a population of 575 
thousand people. The region has a single large city, and is characterized by 
installations for the winning of natural gas. As from 2014, SRG has an 
information management department that is responsible for information and 
communication systems deployed by the Safety Region. This department was the 
sponsor of the study. Their objective was to receive an independent assessment of 
whether the level of reliability of their services was suitable, given the needs of its 
internal customers. The SRG adopted and completed the model crisis plan. The 
main author of this plan did not participate in the study. 
Given the sensitivity of SRG’s operations, all participants agreed to 
confidentiality. Publishing details of the risk analysis or its results could 
jeopardize the effective operation of emergency services, or could make them a 
target for malicious actions. In this paper we can therefore only describe the 
results in general terms and cannot mention specific risks found. 
For the design of our validation we followed the checklist provided by Wieringa 
(2014). In Wieringa’s terminology, the field test described in this paper is 
Technical Action Research, an application of a still-experimental technique in the 
real world to help a client. In the field test described here, the first author of the 
paper (the experimenter) participated in a project within SRG in a real operational 
environment. The experimenter acted as project leader, facilitating the application 
of the Raster method. The goal of the field test was therefore twofold: the sponsor 
(as the client) had an actual question that needed answering, and the experimenter 
wanted to validate the Raster method.  
For validation we had three research questions: 
Q1. Does Raster produce, in practice, risk evaluations that are correct? That 
is, are all relevant risks included (completeness), are low risks excluded 
(conciseness), and are risks presented with the right priorities? 
Q2. What are the costs and effort involved in execution of Raster? 
Q3. Are the target users willing to use the Raster method? 
We describe each question in turn. Correctness of risk evaluations is a difficult 
concept. First, it cannot be determined objectively, because there is no available 
known good standard to compare against. Secondly, information is incomplete 
and the amount of expert judgment is necessarily large. Lastly, risk evaluations 
are uncertain predictions, meaning that they state that some future impact is likely 
or less likely. Crises are infrequent, but even when the impact materializes the fact 
that the event did happen in no way validates or invalidates the risk assessment. It 
is only with a large set of predictions and their outcomes that we can make 
statistical statements about the accuracy of predictions. In that respect risk 
evaluations for crises are very different from other uncertain predictions, such as 
weather forecasts. Because of these difficulties, we must determine correctness in 
a subjective way. Firstly, we asked participants about their personal belief in 
correctness of their risk evaluations; secondly, we will ask participants from 
independent field tests to assess the correctness of each other’s evaluations. Note 
that so far we only completed a single field test; a second field test is planned and 
will be followed by a cross-validation. 
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We now turn to the research question Q2 on costs and effort. Since the parties 
agreed to participate without charge, only effort was relevant. We recorded the 
time spent during project meetings, and the participants reported the amount of 
time they spent on project matters between meetings. 
To see whether target users would want to use Raster themselves (Q3), we used 
the Technology Acceptance Model TAM (Davis, 1989). TAM has been studied 
extensively and, although it has received criticism and several extensions have 
been proposed, its usefulness is well established in research. We use TAM 
because it employs a list of 12 standardized questions that accurately predict 
whether users would adopt new information technology. The list could be 
integrated easily into our own post-test questionnaire. The Raster method falls 
within the scope of TAM, because telecommunication services are information 
technology, and because the use of the Raster software tool forms an essential part 
of the method. 
TAM measures perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use as predictors for 
future behaviour; TAM does not (nor does it intend to) measure objective benefits 
or efficiency gains. The standard TAM questions were translated from English 
into Dutch. 
Before we started the project, a project plan was presented to the sponsor for 
approval. The plan presupposed the participation of experts from diverse 
backgrounds. These experts would perform the Raster method, with the 
experimenter acting only as facilitator and chair. 
At the end of the project, each participant completed a questionnaire, and a guided 
group discussion was held. The purpose of the questionnaire and discussion was 
to provide further information to answer our three research questions. The 
questionnaire contained 38 statements with five possible answers from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree”. 
RESULTS 
After receiving approval on the project plan a kick-off meeting was held, at which 
participants from the various disciplines were present. The managing director of 
SRG was present to express his support. We had representatives from emergency 
medical care, police, civil support, both water boards present in the province, fire 
services (both volunteer and professional), and members of the SRG’s information 
management department. 
All project members were present (with a few apologies) during each of the five 
half-day project meetings. The purposes of plenary meetings were to introduce 
and explain the steps of the Raster method, to collect ideas from all project 
members, and to collectively discuss the main approach to conducting the risk 
analyses. The experimenter and members from the information management 
department convened between plenary meetings to complete tasks that were left 
unfinished during the plenary meetings. The full results were then presented at the 
next plenary meeting for the group’s approval. This way of working allowed for 
efficient use of the expert’s time. 
 
Figure 1: The project’s diagram for fixed telephony (anonymized). Components have 
a shape, colour and emblem to indicating type, location and risk level respectively. 
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The group inspected 10 telecommunication services: civil warning sirens, 
personal mobile radios, paging, VPN connections, satellite telephony, mobile 
telephony, fixed telephony (including Voice over IP, see Figure 1 for an 
anonymized version), the national emergency telephony service, data services, 
and vehicle automation. Together these 10 services contained 205 telecom 
infrastructure components. In all, the project recorded over 1,800 estimates of 
likelihood and impact of vulnerabilities. The final risk list contained 19 important 
availability risks. 
At the project’s end seven participants completed the exit questionnaire, and a 
one-hour guided discussion was held. Copies can be made available on request. 
DISCUSSION 
We now return to our three research questions. For completeness, almost all 
participants agreed that Raster helps to find all large risks quickly (86% agreed or 
strongly agreed), but were less certain when asked whether there are large risks 
that have not been found (14% agreed, 57% had no clear opinion). For 
conciseness, participants almost all agreed that Raster helps to ignore small risks 
quickly (86% (strongly) agreed), but were slightly less certain whether the final 
risk list contains risks that are actually not that important (71% believed this not to 
be the case). All participants agreed that the priorities on the risk list were right. 
We also asked whether participants trusted the results of the project (86% agreed 
strongly), and whether they were willing to take responsibility for the results 
towards their colleagues (all agreed strongly). Overall, we conclude that 
participants believe the results to be correct, but also that they recognize that 
uncertainties are still large. 
The second research question concerns the effort required in execution of Raster. 
Five project members spent on average 16 hours on the entire project; the two 
core members who actively worked on the project between meetings spent on 
average 29 hours. Their combined total of 138 staff-hours excludes time spent by 
the experimenter. According to the participants, the effort was sufficient. Only 
one participant believed that the results would have been better if more time had 
been available (all others scored neutral). Also, it would not have been impossible 
for them to participate if the required time had been higher. 
The questionnaire included the 12 TAM questions in random order and position. 
The 6 questions on perceived ease of use were answered positively: (strongly 
disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree) = (0%, 7%, 27%, 63%, 2%). The 
answers for perceived usefulness were (0%, 7%, 17%, 60%, 17%). These are 
positive results, especially since perceived usefulness is an even stronger predictor 
of future use than perceived ease of use (Davis, 1989). 
All participants were provided with a booklet explaining, in English, the Raster 
method and tool. It surprised us that experts found the lack of a Dutch translation 
a stumbling block. We have since localized the tool, and are completing a Dutch 
translation of the Raster manual. 
The project again confirmed that tool support is essential. Participants found the 
use of colour in diagrams very useful to convey relevant information. We have 
refined the tool based on experiences from the project, and will continue to do so.  
Overall, the participants found the project interesting, stimulating, and very 
useful, not just because of the final risk list but also because it gave them an 
understanding of the workings and complexities of telecom services that 
otherwise remain hidden behind the scenes. We hope that this translates to better 
preparedness and effectiveness; the results do not allow us to draw conclusions 
about that. 
Finally, an interesting question is how the risk list from this project compares to 
the results from the model crisis plan. Comparing the two is difficult, because the 
information management department of SRG had made significant changes to the 
infrastructure after the model crisis plan was written, and before we did the Raster 
assessment. For example, all servers had been outsourced and desktop equipment 
currently consists of thin clients; fixed telephony had been replaced by a hosted 
VoIP solution. Nevertheless, we see that some of the telecom services that 
contained the most risks in the Raster project were assessed as ‘reliable’ in the 
model crisis plan. We believe that Raster gave the more accurate description, 
because its risk evaluations are grounded in a detailed analysis of the technical 
architecture of the telecom services, whereas the model crisis plan did not offer 
any argumentation for its assessments. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A single field test is not sufficient to draw conclusions. We therefore cannot state 
with certainty whether Raster produces correct results with acceptable effort, nor 
whether target users are likely to adopt the method. However, we do find these 
first results very encouraging. The project ran smoothly and easily, project 
members found the risk analysis to be interesting and participated in lively 
discussions. Using the coloured Raster diagrams as a common ground, responders 
and planners were able to collaborate with telecom experts. Together they drafted 
and justified risk evaluations that were approved by all participants as well as the 
sponsor. 
We also tentatively conclude that Raster’s results are complete, concise and 
prioritized correctly. The effort required, about 140 staff-hours over a period of 
six weeks for a medium-sized crisis organization, is significant but appears to be 
acceptable. Perceived ease of use and perceived helpfulness suggest that the 
Raster method would be adopted by its target users, provided that localized 
versions of the manual are available. Successful implementation will probably 
require localized training materials, such as examples and tutorials, as well. 
These results suggest to us that Raster is feasible and useful in practice. 
We need to perform further field tests before we can conclude that Raster offers 
an improvement over current approaches to analysis of telecom service 
availability risks. It would be especially interesting to execute Raster with a team 
that does not include the original researchers. We welcome suggestions from the 
research community for further field tests. 
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